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Introduction
L. Carlin ... entered the Adult Video Store, a licensed sexually oriented
business. [Dawn E. Webber] came forward and offered to help Carlin.
Carlin told appellant that she was experiencing marital problems and
that she was looking for a vibrator-something for sexual gratification.
[Webber] showed Carlin her four best selling devices. [Webber] placed
batteries in these devices and demonstrated their range of speed and
flexibility. Carlin selected one of the devices... 1
L. Carlin was a deputy sheriff conducting an undercover investigation
of Dawn Webber's business.2 For selling Carlin a vibrator, Webber was
arrested and later convicted of promoting an "obscene device"3 in violation
of Texas law.4 She was sentenced to thirty days in jail and fined $4,000.'
Her conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.6 Justice Bea Ann
Smith lamented in her concurrence, "I do not understand why Texas law
criminalizes the sale of dildos devices ... Even less do I understand why
law enforcement officers and prosecutors expend limited resources to
prosecute such activity. Because this is the law, I reluctantly concur."
7
The Fifth Circuit would later invalidate Texas' obscene devices
statute, reasoning that in the aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas,8 the State's
interests in "public morality [] cannot serve as a rational basis... [in
1. Webber v. State, 21 S.W.3d 726, 728-29 (Tex. App. 2000); id. at 729-730
(holding that a dildo was an obscene device as matter of law and that the defendant failed to
preserve issue of whether statute prohibiting promotion of obscene devices violated federal
and state constitutions); see also Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and
Sexual Privacy after Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 27 (2004) (describing
the facts of Webber as a "typical" prosecution under an obscene device statute).
2. Webber, 21 S.W.3d at 728.
3. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.21(a)(7) (West 1994) ("'Obscene device' means a
device including a dildo or artificial vagina, designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs."), invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,
517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
4. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.23(c)(1) (West 1994) ("A person commits an
offense, if knowing its content and character, he ... promotes or possesses with intent to
promote any obscene material or obscene device .....
5. Webber, 21 S.W.3d at 728.
6. Id. at 732.
7. Id. (Smith, J., concurring).
8. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding Texas statute that
criminalized same-sex sodomy violated the Due Process Clause, reasoning that it furthered
"no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual").
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regulating] private sexual intimacy."9 The Court rejected the state's other
arguments, concluding that the case was "not about public sex... [nor]
about controlling commerce in sex.'"
In upholding a nearly identical Alabama statute" in Williams v.
Morgan,'2 the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the statute furthered those
legitimate state interests-the regulation of public, commercial activity.13
Because Lawrence's limited holding invalidated a state prohibition on
same-sex sodomy which criminalized private, non-commercial sexual
activity, Lawrence provided no support to the vendor and consumer
plaintiffs challenging the Alabama statute.'
4
This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit reached the correct result in
invalidating Texas's obscene devices statute, but not on the grounds that
Reliable Consultants is a more faithful application of the Supreme Court's
Lawrence decision than was the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Williams VI.
This Note will demonstrate that both decisions can be read as plausible
doctrinal interpretations of Lawrence, which was itself consistent with the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, albeit in some combined
form of its equal protection and substantive due process lines of cases.
Instead, the first part of this Note argues that the Lawrence decision and its
progeny demonstrate the inherent instability of the Court's whimsical
approach to personal liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment, such that
sounder doctrinal footing is needed to adequately protect the rights of gays,
lesbians, and other sexual minorities against legislative use of majoritarian
morality and its concomitant judicial standard of tiered scrutiny. The
second part of this Note finds doctrinal support for sexual privacy in an
originalist conception of the states' police power, as informed by the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and
the Fourteenth Amendment.
9. Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 745.
10. Id. at 746.
11. See Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.2 (prohibiting the distribution of "any device
designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs").
12. See Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the statute prohibiting the distribution of devices designed or marketed for
stimulation of genital organs furthered legitimate state interests).
13. Id. at 1322.
14. See id. ("To the extent Lawrence rejects public morality as a legitimate
government interest, it invalidates only those laws that target conduct that is both private and
non-commercial.").
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PART I: What Lawrence Hath Wrought: Substantive Due Process Put
Asunder
The opinion is so opaque that it bears a great many
interpretations.... It is at once self-important and self-preservative.
It instructs the nation how to think about grand concepts but leaves
maximum room for the Justices themselves to maneuver in the
future. 15
Analyzing and criticizing Lawrence has become something of a
cottage industry in the legal academic community. Scholars have argued
that Lawrence marks the Court's implicit shift toward a "presumption of
liberty;"'16 that it is merely an extension of prior substantive due process
cases;' 7 that it is incoherent and takes substantive due process too far from
its moorings;' 8 that it does not go far enough in protecting gay rights;' 9 that
its analysis of substantive due process is just about correct;20 that it
15. Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1140, 1149-50
(2004).
16. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 21, 36 (2003) [hereinafter "Barnett, Libertarian Revolution"]; ef
Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
945, 970 (2004) [hereinafter "Massey, The New Formalism"] ("In a highly diluted form,
Justice Kennedy and the Court may have adopted a variation on Barnett's theme.").
17. See Carpenter, supra note 15, at 1152 (explaining that the Court does not declare a
generalized "presumption of liberty."). As explained by Carpenter:
Nowhere does the Court declare a generalized "presumption of liberty." Nor
does it engage in a libertarian analysis finding a "liberty," distinguishing it from
"license," then shifting the burden of persuasion of constitutionality to the state,
a burden that could be met only upon a finding that the law was "necessary and
proper" to the achievement of its objective.
Id.
18. See Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1585 (2004) ("Whatever new rights the court may find or refuse to
find among 'the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities,' Lawrence will stand
primarily for the proposition that due process jurisprudence has transcended the bounds of
rational discourse.") (citations omitted); and see Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 96 (2004) (arguing
Lawrence "shatters" the Rehnquist Court's circumscribed approach to substantive due
process).
19. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1399, 1399 (2004) (concluding that Lawrence recognizes a kind of
privatized liberty right that affords gays and lesbians intimacy in the bedroom but little
more).
20. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare
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represents good judicial "statesmanship;"'" that it "undermined the very
foundation upon which the Court has built the obscenity doctrine; ' 22 that it
leaves a substantial portion of obscenity doctrine untouched;23 and that it
may mark the end of tiered scrutiny.24 Since the Lawrence opinion is
apparently grounded in some form of substantive due process,25 this Note
proceeds with a discussion of the origins of that doctrine.
A. Substantive Due Process: From the Magna Carta to Lawrence
The intellectual origins of the doctrine of substantive due process can
be traced to the Magna Carta. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, which read
that "[n]o free man shall be taken, imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed,
banished, or in any way destroyed... [unless] by the lawful judgment of
his peers and by the law of the land,, 26 was intended to ensure that no free
Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1937 (2004) [hereinafter "Tribe, Fundamental
Right"] ("The whole of substantive due process, Lawrence teaches us, is larger than, and
conceptually different from, the sum of its parts .... [suggesting] the globally unifying
theme of shielding from state control value-forming and value-transmitting
relationships. .. .") (emphasis omitted).
21. See Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1171, 1180
(2004) [hereinafter "Koppelman, Penumbra"] (arguing that "the Court had very good
political reasons for avoiding transparency in both its reasoning and its rule"); cf Witt v.
Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Lawrence is, perhaps
intentionally so, silent as to the level of scrutiny that it applied. .. ").
22. Michael P. Allen, The Underappreciated First Amendment Importance of
Lawrence v. Texas, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1045, 1062 (2008).
23. Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and Harm: Why Miller Should
Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 611, 611 (2008).
24. See Massey, The New Formalism, supra note 16, at 957 (arguing that Lawrence
"may prove to further destabilize the already leaning tower of tiered scrutiny"); Paul M.
Secunda, Lawrence's Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117, 120 (2005) ("[T]he Court softens the
hard edges of the normal tiered approach and engages in a more informal constitutional
balancing of the relevant state and individual interests to determine which interests should
prevail.").
25. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) ("We granted certiorari ... [to
resolve whether] petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in
the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). The other questions raised in the grant of
certiorari concerned whether to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)--a
substantive due process case-and whether the statutes denied petitioners the right to equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Lawrence court declined
to directly address. See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75 (admitting the possibility of
deciding the case on equal protection grounds but refusing to do so).
26. Magna Carta, ch. 39, reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE MAGNA CARTA: TEXT
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Englishman "could be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by (1)
judgment prior to execution of sentence, (2) delivered by one's peers, and
(3) according to the laws of England. 2 7  Lord Edward Coke in some
contexts "implie[d] that the law of the land incorporates a substantive
limitation on the authority of the king, acting either in his legislative
capacity or in his executive capacity. 2 8 Sir William Blackstone likewise
construed "the law of the land" 29 to contain a substantive prohibition on the
Crown and Parliament as well.30 References from the founding era through
the antebellum period indicate that American jurists understood the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as embodying the Magna Carta's
understanding of the law of the land. Numerous state bills of rights
contained provisions paralleling that of the law of the land.31 Four such
provisions were introduced at state conventions during the ratification of
the federal constitution.32 While there was little debate on the proposed
amendment, an early Supreme Court case alluded to the possibility that
there were natural substantive limitations on legislative power as a result of
the social compact.33 In Murrays' Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co.,34 Justice Benjamin Curtis determined that "the [Due Process Clause] is
a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers
of the government., 35 Curtis's reasoning linked the Fifth Amendment with
the Magna Carta's law of the land language.36 The most famous Fifth
& COMMENTARY 45 (Rev. ed. University Press of Virginia 1998) (1215).
27. EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PRIVACY, AND PROPERTY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE
OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 11 (The Pennsylvania State University Press 1996).
28. See id. at 12 (citing the granting of monopolies as substantively against "the law of
the land").
29. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, WiS. L. REv. 941, 972 (1990).
30. See id. (describing Blackstone's treatment of the Magna Carta's protection of
personal security as referring "not just to procedure but to definition of the offense and its
punishment").
31. See KEYNES, supra note 27, at 14-15 (citing the Virginia Declaration of Rights and
the Massachusetts Constitution's Bill of Rights as examples).
32. See id. at 17-18 (explaining that Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina and
Virginia were the four states that introduced provisions).
33. See id. at 20-21 ("Men have a sense of property: property is necessary to their
subsistence .... No man could become a member of a community in which he could not
enjoy the fruits of his honest labor and industry.") (citing Samuel Chase's dictum in Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)).
34. Murrays' Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1856).
35. Id. at 276.
36. See id. ("The words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to
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Amendment due process case is probably Dred Scott v. Sandford,37 in
which Chief Justice Taney determined that the Fifth Amendment protected
the "property" of U.S. citizens in their slaves in U.S. territories, thus
invalidating the Missouri Compromise."
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
"guarantee[] more than fair process."39 Substantive due process "provides
heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests." 4° The Court deems fundamental
those asserted rights and liberty interests "which are, objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.",'41 Among the rights protected by heightened scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to marriage and marital
privacy, to reproduction, to raise children, to access and use contraceptives,
to maintain bodily integrity, to have an abortion, and to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.42 The Court is generally reluctant to expand the
convey the same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna
Carta.").
37. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment prohibited Congress from depriving a citizen of property merely because the
citizen brought the property into a particular territory of the United States). In so holding,
the Court stated that:
[T]he rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed on the
same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of
law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into
a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.
Id. at 450.
38. Id. at449-51.
39. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
id. (holding that "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court").
40. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65
(refusing to find fundamental right to assisted suicide in upholding statute that prohibited the
practice).
41. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937))
42. See Washington, 521 U.S.. at 720 (citing cases that have identified rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment requiring strict scrutiny).
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protections of substantive due process "because guideposts for responsible
decision-making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.,
43
In Washington v. Glucksberg,44 the Court attempted to provide such
guideposts by establishing a two-part inquiry for evaluating whether
asserted rights and liberty interests are fundamental. First, the right must be
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition., 45 Second, the right
asserted must be carefully described such that the Court can look to the
interest's place within American "history, legal traditions, and practices."
46
Plaintiffs in Glucksberg sought to invalidate a Washington statute banning
assisted suicide.47 The Court carefully described the plaintiffs' claimed
right not as the "right to die," but "a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so."'48 Finding that right has not been
protected in American legal history, and instead has been persistently
rejected, the Court concluded that, "the asserted 'right' to assistance in
committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause. 49
Many scholars criticized the Glucksberg Court's emphasis on a
"carefully described" interest's place within our traditions. Professor
Randy Barnett of Georgetown University Law Center argues that
Glucksberg's attempt to provide clear rules in the confusing realm of
substantive due process is itself confusing.50 Pre-eminent constitutional
scholar Laurence Tribe views Glucksberg as inconsistent with the roots of
43. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 705.
48. Id. at 723.
49. Id. at 728.
50. See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1479, 1489 (2008)
[hereinafter "Barnett, Scrutiny Land'] (observing the lack of clarity in the Glucksberg
Court's reasoning and how the decision raised several ambiguities in due process
jurisprudence). Barnett explained that:
There is much that is unclear about the Glucksberg version of this formulation.
Does a right have to be both deeply rooted in tradition and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, or just one or the other? Is a right's rootedness in
history and tradition a sign that it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty?
Or, more likely, is the absence of its traditional protection a sign that it is not
implicit? Perhaps most importantly, does a liberty need to have been legally
protected in our traditions or merely traditionally unregulated?
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modem substantive due process. 51 Tribe and Michael Doff, currently a
professor at Cornell University Law School, previously had criticized
attempts to limit substantive due process protections by narrowing the
definition of the asserted interest. 52 In Michael H. v. Gerald D. 53 Justice
Scalia, in a portion of his plurality opinion joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, suggested that the Court "refer to the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right can be identified. 54 As Tribe and Dorf point out, this approach would
not only undermine due process protection of the rights of political
minorities,55 but would also fail to achieve its purported goal of judicial
restraint.56 Since determining the historical traditions requires a subjective
selection of historical sources, "extraction of fundamental rights from
societal traditions is no more value-neutral than the extraction of
fundamental rights from legal precedent. 5 7 While such criticisms went
unheeded in Glucksberg, the Court would again face the issue of how to
evaluate fundamental liberty interests in Lawrence v. Texas.
51. See Tribe, Fundamental Right, supra note 20, at 1934. Stating that:
Meyer and Pierce, the two sturdiest pillars of the substantive due process
temple ... did not describe what they were protecting merely as the personal
activities of sending one's child to a religious school (Pierce v. Society of
Sisters) or... of hiring a teacher to educate one's child in the German language
(Meyer).
Id.
52. See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. Ct-. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
53. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the
claim by a man claiming to be the natural father of the right to visit his child conceived by a
married woman).
54. Id. at 127 n.6 (Scalia, J. Opinion).
55. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 52, at 1086-87 ("[E]ven if Justice Scalia's program
were workable, it would achieve judicial neutrality by all but abdicating the judicial
responsibility to protect individual rights.... Legally cognizable 'traditions'... tend to
mirror majoritarian, middle-class conventions.").
56. See id. at 1087 ("To acknowledge the manipulability of historical traditions is to
recognize that all history is summary. The lens of the historical camera, in focusing on one
event, necessarily blurs others.").
57. Id. at 1086.
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B. The Lawrence Decision
Lawrence cannot be addressed without some introductory discussion
of the case it overruled, Bowers v. Hardwick.58 There the Court upheld
Georgia's prohibition of sodomy against constitutional challenge:
respondent Michael Hardwick, an adult male, had been convicted of
violating in engaging in sodomy with another adult male under Georgia's
prohibition of sodomy statute. 9  In an approach foreshadowing that of
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg,60 Justice White framed the issue for
the Bowers majority as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.",6' White's
opinion emphasized, "proscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots.
' 62
Thus, "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' is, at best, facetious., 63  Finding no fundamental right to
homosexual sodomy, the Bowers majority rejected Hardwick's argument
that the legislature's views on morality could not provide a rational basis
for sustaining the statute, noting that "[t]he law ... is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices
are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very
busy indeed."64  The statute therefore was upheld and Hardwick's
conviction affirmed.65
Justice Blackmun in dissent attacked the majority's conduct-based
fundamental rights analysis, arguing that the case was not about the
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy but "[r]ather... is
about the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
58. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the legislature had a rational basis for creating anti-
sodomy laws and that Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) was constitutional, as are statutes
in other states that prohibit sodomy).
59. Id. at 196 (upholding Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) defining and
criminalizing sodomy).
60. See, e.g., Barnett, Scrutiny Land, supra note 50, at 1488 ("The first step of
Rehnquist's formula in Glucksberg was borrowed (without attribution) from Justice White's
opinion for the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick...
61. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
62. Id. at 191-94.
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civilized men, namely, the right to be let alone. ''66 Justice Stevens noted
that the statute by its terms is intended to apply to heterosexuals as well as
homosexuals, and the Court's prior substantive due process cases preclude
application of the statute against heterosexuals.67 Justice Stevens then
argued that the State's purported basis for the selective application of the
statute against homosexuals was not "supported by a neutral and legitimate
interest-something more substantial than a habitual dislike for, or
ignorance about, the disfavored group.,
68
Strands of both Bowers' dissents can be found in Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Lawrence. The Court disagreed with the issue as stated in
Bowers: "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as
it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse., 69  Lawrence viewed the
continued validity of Bowers and criminal sodomy statutes as a "stigma" on
homosexuals that could be removed only by explicitly overruling Bowers
and invalidating all such statutes.70 As part of its "judicial decision as
atonement, ' 71 the Lawrence majority cloaked its opinion in the language of
liberty, autonomy of self, meaning, and existence.72 Tribe approvingly
describes the Court's analysis: "in order to assess the constitutionality of
the state's preferred allocation of roles, the Court traversed time and space,
encompassing contemporary as well as historical understandings and values
we share with a wider civilization.
7 3
The Lawrence Court explicitly adopted Stevens' analysis in Bowers
that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
66. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
67. See id. at 216-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) as cases limiting the power of
States to reach private, consensual sexual relations among heterosexual adults).
68. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 219 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
70. See id. at 575 (declining to adopt Justice O'Connor's equal protection clause
analysis to invalidate the Texas statute in order to overrule the central holding of Bowers);
accord Tribe, Fundamental Right, supra note 20, at 1910 (arguing that a sex-neutral ban on
sodomy would be akin to a "Sword of Damocles that does its awful work not by beheading
its victim but simply by dangling above its victim's neck").
71. Carpenter, supra note 15, at 1148.
72. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 ("Liberty presumes an autonomy of
self .... ).
73. Tribe, Fundamental Right, supra note 20, at 1931 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice. 7 4  Without declaring whether there was a
fundamental right to private, consensual sexual relations among
homosexual adults or stating the standard of review it was applying, the
Court opaquely held that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of
the individual. 75  In his dissent, Justice Scalia attacked the Court for
overruling Bowers while failing to specifically overrule its holding that
there is no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy.76 Scalia then
criticized the Court for "decree[ing] the end of all morals legislation" in
holding that a statute cannot survive rational basis review solely on the
grounds that it promotes majoritarian sexual morality.
77
Constitutional scholars have generally agreed that-whether its
outcome was correct or its reasons for opacity beneficia178 -Lawrence
provided no clear rule by which to govern future cases concerning privacy,
morality, and substantive due process.79 Despite Scalia's criticism to the
contrary, the Court suggested in portions of its opinion that there was a
fundamental liberty interest in private sexual relations among adult
homosexuals. Justice Kennedy cites the Court's landmark substantive due
74. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Stevens' dissent in Bowers and
emphasizing that "Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in
Bowers and should control here") (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court today does not overrule [the
Bowers] holding. Not once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or
a 'fundamental liberty interest,' nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny.").
77. See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing prohibitions "against fornication,
bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity" as laws furthering majoritarian
sexual morality).
78. See generally Koppelman, Penumbra, supra note 21.
79. See Tribe, Fundamental Right, supra note 20, at 1916 ("One aspect of Lawrence
that was bound to draw criticism and is likely to generate confusion unless promptly put into
proper perspective is the absence of any explicit statement in the majority opinion about the
standard of review the Court employed. .. ."); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 18, at 1585
("[Tihe most salient characteristic of Lawrence is the impossibility of determining what it
means. . . ."); Carpenter, supra note 15, at 1149 ("The opinion... bears a great many
interpretations."); John Allon Garland, Sex as a Form of Gender and Expression after
Lawrence v. Texas, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 297, 307 (2006) ("Lawrence's lack of clarity
about the nature of the right it recognized may already be promoting its narrowing.");
Secunda, supra note 24, at 128 ("[The) exercise in divining the proper judicial standard of
review from the Lawrence majority is rendered difficult by the exceedingly enigmatic nature
of the opinion."); cf Tribe, Fundamental Right, supra note 20, at 1895 ("[lt will be
daunting task at the midpoint of the twenty-first century to evaluate the differences
Lawrence will have made .... ).
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process decisions in his discussion of liberty. 0 In holding that Texas's ban
on homosexual sodomy "furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual,"8' the
Court uses the terminology of rational basis review, but in a comparative
context that suggests that a more exacting form of scrutiny than traditional
rational basis is actually at work. Since traditional rational basis review
does not balance the interest of the individual against that of the state, some
view Lawrence's holding as an implicit recognition of a fundamental right
to homosexual sodomy. 2 But if this is so, Justice Kennedy's failure either
to apply or to distinguish Glucksberg is difficult to explain. Justice
Kennedy was careful elsewhere to explain why stare decisis did not
preclude the majority from overruling Bowers. 3 The Court's refusal to
address Glucksberg-which borrowed from Bowers in its two-pronged
fundamental rights analysis 4 -thus indicates that the Court did not find a
new fundamental right in Lawrence.
85
80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2008) (arguing that the Lawrence
Court "recognized a protected liberty interest for adults to engage in consensual sexual
intimacy in the home"). The case also proposes that the Court applied more than minimal
scrutiny in evaluating the sodomy statute in part because "[r]ational basis review does not
permit consideration of the strength of the individual's interest or the extent of the intrusion
on that interest caused by the law; the focus is entirely on the rationality of the state's reason
for enacting the law."; Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive
Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 23, 30 (2005) ("Assessing whether the state's
interest is significant enough to vindicate what the state has done-balancing the state's
interest against that of the individual-is not rational basis review. It is, however, typical of
protected liberty cases . . . ."); Carpenter, supra note 15, at 1150-51, 1157 (noting the
recognition of "the personal and private life of an individual" as a fundamental right means
that a mere legitimate state interest in regulating the personal and private life of an
individual is an insufficient basis for upholding the contested statute). In so noting,
Carpenter observed that Lawrence "does not declare categorically that Texas's interest in the
statute is not 'legitimate' .. .the interest is measured against the strength of the right
claimed. If 'the personal and private life of the individual' involves the exercise of a
fundamental right... then the state's mere legitimate interest in regulating it for morality's
sake is of course insufficient." Id.; cf Massey, The New Formalism, supra note 16, at 959
("[T]here are textual morsels in the Court's opinion... that hint that there is something more
than minimal scrutiny at work. .. ").
83. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (finding a lack of "individual or societal reliance
on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once there are
compelling reasons to do so").
84. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
85. See Barnett, Libertarian Revolution, supra note 16, at 35 ("In the majority's
opinion, there is not even the pretense of a 'fundamental right' rebutting the 'presumption of
constitutionality."'); Massey, The New Formalism, supra note 16, at 959 ("Lawrence
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Lawrence can also be read as fitting somewhere between the Court's
fundamental rights-strict scrutiny line of cases and traditional minimal
scrutiny. The Court's emphasis on Romer v. Evans,86 which used imputed
legislative animus against homosexuals as a class to invalidate a state
constitutional amendment, is instructive. Just as Romer did not find that
homosexuals were a "suspect class" under the Equal Protection Clause for
purposes of triggering strict scrutiny of the challenged amendment,
Lawrence did not declare a "fundamental liberty interest" in private
homosexual conduct, such that laws abridging that interest would be subject
to strict scrutiny review. 87 Both Romer and Lawrence invalidated state laws
that had the effect of discriminating against homosexuals without providing
homosexuals the protection of strict scrutiny when legislative majorities
enact statutes that either infringe on their liberties either as individuals or as
a class of persons. Andrew Koppelman, a constitutional scholar who has
published extensively on gay rights issues88 and morals legislation,89 argues
that the primary contribution of Lawrence to substantive due process
jurisprudence is that it contains a "penumbra" serving as a basis to strike
down antigay laws.90
presently stands as the lone instance in the modem era of substantive due process in which
the Court has struck down a law on the grounds that it failed even minimal scrutiny."). But
ef Carpenter, supra note 15, at 1163 (arguing that "Lawrence can be squared with
Glucksberg" because bans on same-sex sodomy are a recent innovation and the Bowers
characterization of the asserted liberty interest in sodomy is not a "careful description" of the
claimed right because it trivializes it).
86. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (holding that the amendment,
which denied protected status under Colorado law to homosexuals, raised "the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward [homosexuals]" such
that the Amendment was not "directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete
objective").
87. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overturning Lawrence on the grounds that "[t]he
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.").
88. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERiCAN LAW (2002).
89. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLuM.
L. REV. 1635 (2005) (discussing whether obscenity does cause moral harm and whether
legislation should be used to prevent that harm).
90. See Koppelman, Penumbra, supra note 21, at 1180, 1182-83 (arguing that Limon
v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003) (mem.), which vacated a pre-Lawrence sentence for same-
sex statutory rape under a statute that punished the offense more harshly than heterosexual
statutory rape, indicates that the Court views Lawrence as putting "all anti-gay laws under
suspicion").
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Not surprisingly, the lower courts have mirrored academics in their
disparate interpretations of the Lawrence opinion. The Seventh,91 Tenth,92
and Eleventh93 Circuits have taken the view that Lawrence did not
announce a fundamental right to consensual sexual privacy.94 In addressing
a challenge to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the Ninth
Circuit determined that intermediate scrutiny applies to challenges
implicating liberty interests such as those at issue in Lawrence." The First
Circuit, however, found that there is something like a fundamental liberty
interest recognized by Lawrence, but that it is a narrow one,96
Addressing nearly identical obscene devices statutes, the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits reached opposite results, which this Note will now
address.
C. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation of Lawrence
In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle,97 plaintiff businesses wishing to
advertise and sell sexual devices in Texas filed for declaratory and
91. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Lawrence also did not
announce, as Muth claims it did, a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, for
adults to engage in all manner of consensual sexual conduct, specifically in this case,
incest.").
92. See Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing
that "nowhere in Lawrence does the Court describe the right at issue in that case as a
fundamental right or a fundamental liberty interest. It instead applied rational basis review
to the law and found it lacking").
93. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817
(lth Cir. 2004) (concluding that "it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of
Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right").
94. The Eighth Circuit is likewise dubious that there exists a fundamental right to
sexual privacy. See Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing
that the Lawrence opinion's "language implies that the Court applied a rational-basis
standard of review instead of a strict-scrutiny standard, inferring that the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right") (dictum).
95. See Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[W]hen the
government attempts to intrude upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a
manner that implicates the rights identified in Lawrence, the government must advance an
important governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further that interest, and the
intrusion must be necessary to further that interest.").
96. See Cook v. Gates 528 F.3d 42, 56 ("Lawrence recognized... a narrowly defined
liberty interest in adult consensual sexual intimacy in the confines of one's home and one's
own private life.").
97. See Reliable Consultants v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
Texas could not, by statute declare the devices at issue as obscene, though advertisements
for those devices could, under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, be deemed obscene).
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injunctive relief, seeking an injunction against enforcement of the obscene
devices statute on the grounds that it violated their substantive liberty rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 The district court dismissed plaintiffs'
action for failure to state a claim, holding that as there was no
constitutionally protected right to promote obscene devices, the Texas
statute did not violate due process. 99 The Fifth Circuit rejected the state's
threshold argument that the businesses lacked standing to assert the
individual rights of their potential customers.'00 The court determined that
Supreme Court precedent established that denial of access to a proscribed
product is akin to denial of use of the product itself.1 1 On the merits of the
constitutional claim, the plaintiffs argued that "the right at stake is the
individual's substantive due process right to engage in private intimate
conduct free from government intrusion," while the State argued that it was
"the right to stimulate one's genitals for non-medical purposes unrelated to
procreation or outside of an interpersonal relationship."' 0 2 The court
rejected the State's framing of the issue, noting Justice Kennedy's criticism
of the Bowers majority's characterization of the right at issue there. 0 3 The
appellate court determined that Lawrence applied because it "explain[ed]
the contours of the substantive due process right to sexual intimacy." 104
The Court in Reliable Consultants court stressed throughout its
opinion that it was applying Lawrence to the statute, attempting to
analogize the litigants' arguments in Lawrence to those of the litigants in
98. See id. at 742 ("Just as in Lawrence the State here wants to use its laws to enforce
a public moral code by restricting private intimate conduct.").
99. See id. ("The district court held, inter alia, that the statute does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment because there is no constitutionally protected right to publicly
promote obscene devices.").
100. See id. at 743 (finding that plaintiffs had standing under Supreme court precedent
established in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381, U.S. 479 (1965)). The Fifth Circuit explained
that the "State argues that Plaintiffs, who distribute sexual devices for profit, cannot assert
the individual rights of their customers. This argument fails under the Supreme Court
precedent holding that (1) bans on commercial transactions involving a product can
unconstitutionally burden individual substantive due process rights and (2) lawsuits making
this claim may be brought by providers of the product. " Id.
101. See id. at 743 n.21-22 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-91 (1977); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997)).
102. Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. See id. (declaring that Lawrence recognized "a right to be free from governmental
intrusion regarding 'the most private human conduct, sexual behavior"') (quoting Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
104. Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d. at 744.
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Reliable Consultants to produce a straightforward result.105 The Fifth
Circuit determined that, since the Supreme Court did not address what
standard of review applied to the statute in Lawrence, the Fifth Circuit did
not need to determine whether to apply rational basis review or strict
scrutiny in evaluating the obscene devices statute. 1°6 Like the Lawrence
Court, the Fifth Circuit weighed the state's interest in public morality
against the individual liberty interest claimed, and determined that, post-
Lawrence, "public morality ... cannot serve as a rational basis for Texas's
statute, which... regulates private sexual intimacy.'"17  The court
determined that the statute was too "heavy-handed" a restriction to provide
a rational relationship with the state's interest in the "protection of
minors ... from exposure to sexual devices."'1 8 Texas's similar interest in
protecting "unwilling adults" from exposure to obscene devices likewise
failed to sustain the statute because the Supreme Court "has consistently
refused to burden individual rights out of concern for the protection of
unwilling recipients. '"10 9 The state argued that striking down the statute in
this manner would effectively extend due process protection to "the
commercial sale of sex." 110  The appellate court rejected this argument,
distinguishing the liberty to purchase the device for later use in private from
the actual "sale of sex.""' The court again analogized the asserted rights
and interests to those at issue in Lawrence, determining that, "[j]ust as in
Lawrence, the State here wants to use its laws to enforce a public moral
code by restricting private intimate conduct."'"12 The court couched its
disapproval of Texas' statutory declaration that sexual devices are obscene
per se within the language of Lawrence.13 The obscene devices statute was
struck down as unconstitutional"14
105. See id. at 745-46 ("[Olur responsibility as an inferior federal court is mandatory
and straightforward [w]e must apply Lawrence .... Just as in Lawrence, the State here
wants to use its laws to enforce a public moral code by restricting private intimate
conduct.").
106. See id. at 744-45 ("Because of Lawrence, the issue before us is whether the Texas
statute impermissibly burdens the individual's substantive due process right to engage in
private intimate conduct of his or her choosing.").
107. Id. at 745.
108. Id. at 746.
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Compare id. ("The case is not about public sex. It is not about controlling
commerce in sex. It is about controlling what people do in the privacy of their own homes
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While the Fifth Circuit used the terminology of rational basis review in
its opinion, it was careful to avoid declaring or denying that any particular
standard of review applied, such that it could apply Lawrence in as simple a
fashion as possible." 5  Perhaps coincidentally, just as the Lawrence
majority omitted any discussion of Justice Scalia's concerns about the
scope of the Lawrence holding, so too did the Fifth Circuit in Reliable
Consultants fail to address the arguments of the dissent. 16  Judge
Barksdale, concurring in part and dissenting in part, distinguished
Lawrence on the grounds that the conduct protected in that case was
entirely private, whereas the obscene devices statute regulated "the sale of
what [Texas] defines as obscene devices ... conduct [that] is both public
and commercial." ' " As noted in the dissent, this was the rationale adopted
by the Eleventh Circuit in upholding an identical Alabama statute after
several remands and appeals."l
8
D. The Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation of Lawrence
The Supreme Court handed down the Lawrence decision at a time
when the Eleventh Circuit and Northern District of Alabama were
because the State is morally opposed to a certain type of consensual private conduct."), with
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (noting that the case at hand involved two
adults engaged in consensual homosexual practices). The Lawrence Court explained more
fully:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.
It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
Id.
114. See Reliable Consultants, 517 F.3d at 747 ("Whatever one might think or believe
about these devices, government interference with their personal and private use violates the
Constitution.").
115. See id. at 744 ("The Supreme Court did not address the classification [of the
applicable standard of review], nor do we need to do so.").
116. See id. (noting the differing standards of reviews discussed in the dissent without
addressing them).
117. Id. at 749 (Barksdale, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. See id. ("I agree that, [t]o the extent Lawrence rejects public morality as a
legitimate government interest, it invalidates only those laws that target conduct that is both
private and non-commercial.") (Barksdale, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cit. 2007)).
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deliberating upon whether there was a fundamental right of sexual
privacy." 9 In Williams v. Pryor,120 vendors and users of sexual devices
challenged the constitutionality of an Alabama statute that defined those
devices as obscene and banned their distribution. 2 ' The vendor and user
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing the statute
on the grounds that it "will infringe upon their fundamental right to privacy
and personal autonomy secured by the United States Constitution.' ' 22 The
district court determined that while the plaintiffs' fundamental right
argument that the statute burdened a fundamental right had some appeal,
[B]ased on the Supreme Court's focus on history and tradition, [its]
express reluctance to extend the protection of the Due Process Clause,
its narrow readings of cases recognizing liberty interests as fundamental,
and its statements that it has not yet decided a case squarely on point,
this court refuses to extend the fundamental right of privacy to protect
the plaintiffs' interest in using devices "designed or marketed as useful
primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs" when engaging in
lawful, private, sexual activity, and thereby impose a strict scrutiny
frame of analysis when reviewing the Alabama statute at issue.'
23
The district court then proceeded to evaluate the statute under rational
basis review. 24  The court found that the state's asserted interests in
banning public displays of obscenity; banning "commerce of sexual
stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake, unrelated to marriage,
procreation or family relationships"; and "banning commerce of obscene
material" were all legitimate state interests.
25
119. See Williams v. Pryor (Williams 1), 41 F. Supp. 2d. 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999), rev'd
and remanded Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944 (1 1th Cir. 2001), on remand,
Williams v. Pryor (Williams Il), 220 F. Supp. 2d. 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev'd and
remanded Williams v. Attorney General of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir.
2004), on remand, Williams v. King (Williams ), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2006);
aff'd sub nom. Williams v. Morgan (Williams Vi), 478 F.3d 1316 (11 th Cir. 2007).
120. See Williams v. Pryor (Williams 1), 41 F. Supp. 2d. at 1288-93 (applying rational
basis review to the Alabama statute at issue and holding that the statute reflected legitimate
state interests but that none of the interests were rationally related to the statute at issue).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1284 (quoting Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1)).
124. See Williams 1, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 ("Although Alabama Code § 13A-12-
200.2(a)(1) has escaped strict scrutiny, it still must survive review under the rational basis
test.").
125. Id. at 1288-90 (first alteration in original).
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The court found none of these interests rationally related to the statute,
however. 126 The court deemed the state's interest in banning the public
display of obscene material was too weak an interest to support a general
prohibition on the distribution of sexual devices. 127 Indeed, it would have
been "absolutely arbitrary" for the legislature to have enacted the statute
solely upon that basis. 128  The court found that Alabama's interest in
banning "the commerce of sexual stimulation and auto-eroticism" was not
rationally related to the statute, because the statute by its terms interfered
with such conduct regardless of the marital status of the individuals using
the devices while the asserted interest was limited to such conduct
"unrelated to marriage, procreation[,] or familial relationships."', 29 The
statute was also an irrational means of banning obscenity, as it swept within
its prohibition "all sexual devices in an effort to prohibit the few which may
be found obscene." 3 Since the statute was thus "an exaggerated response
to the State's concerns," 131 it failed rational basis review.
132
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's
rational basis analysis. 133 The appellate court stressed that rational basis
review is a "highly deferential standard"'134 that requires a finding of
constitutionality "so long as 'there is any reasonably conceivable state of
126. See id. at 1288-93 ("[T]his court finds that the prohibition on the distribution of
sexual devices found in Alabama Code § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1), bears no reasonable, rational
relation to a legitimate state interest.").
127. See id. at 1288 ("Innumerable measures far short of an absolute ban on the
distribution of sexual devices would accomplish the State's goals.").
128. See id. ("The proscription [against sexual devices is] ... absolutely arbitrary.
Innumerable measures far short of an absolute ban on the distribution of sexual devices
would accomplish the State's goals.").
129. See id. at 1288-90 ("Banning commerce of sexual devices is not rationally related
to this end, because such a ban inevitably interferes with sexual stimulation and auto-
eroticism which is related to marriage, procreation, and familial relationships.").
130. See id. at 1293 (alteration in original) (stating that, while certain devices may be
obscene, and therefore legitimately proscribed, many of the devices proscribed by the
challenged statute are not obscene, so the prohibition is an exaggerated response to the
State's concerns).
131. Id.
132. See id. (noting that the statute in question was "an overly broad means of
regulating or prohibiting commerce in obscenity.").
133. See Williams v. Pryor (Williams I), 240 F.3d 944, 949 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
district court erred in determining the statute lacks a rational basis. The State's interest in
public morality is a legitimate interest rationally served by the statute.").
134. Id. at 948 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314
(1993)) (alteration omitted).
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facts that could provide a rational basis for the' statute."' 35 The court noted
that incremental steps are not a defect in legislation under rational basis
scrutiny, so Alabama did not act irrationally by prohibiting only the
commercial distribution of sexual devices rather than some more narrow
prohibition. 136 The court thus held that the statute was constitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment because there was at least one rational basis
justifying its provisions.1
37
The court then addressed plaintiffs' fundamental rights claims,
determining that the district court was correct insofar as it rejected a facial
challenge to the statute on the grounds that it burdened a fundamental right,
because "[a]pplication of Alabama's statute to those who sell sexual
devices to minors, to such extent that those devices are deemed harmful to
minors, would not violate any fundamental right.' 38 Since the statute could
conceivably be applied in a constitutional fashion it was not facially
unconstitutional. 139 The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless found that the district
court erred in failing to properly consider the statute as applied against the
fundamental rights claims of the user plaintiffs, since the plaintiffs' as-
applied challenge "implicate[d] different and important interests in sexual
privacy."'' 40 The appellate court cited Glucksberg's requirement of careful
consideration of fundamental rights claims and found the record before it
"bare" of the kind of evidence needed to apply the Glucksberg
framework.' 4' The case was thus remanded to the Northern District of
Alabama for further consideration of the plaintiffs' as-applied challenge.
4 2
On remand, the district court conducted a Glucksberg analysis,
examining America's legal tradition regarding sexual privacy to determine
135. Williams II, 240 F.3d at 948.
136. See id. at 950 ("[I]ncremental steps are not a defect in legislation under rational
scrutiny basis, so Alabama did not act irrationally by prohibiting only the commercial
distribution of sexual devices.").
137. See id. at 949 ("The State's interest in public morality is a legitimate interest
rationally served by the statute.").
138. Id.at954-55.
139. See id. at 955 ("The statute has possible constitutional applications and therefore is
not facially unconstitutional.").
140. Id.
141. See id. at 956 ("The court analyzed neither whether our nation has a deeply rooted
history of state interference, or state non-interference, in the private sexual activity of
married or unmarried persons nor whether contemporary practice bolsters or undermines any
such history.").
142. See id. ("[P]laintiffs' as-applied fundamental rights challenges must be considered
further by the district court.").
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whether the Alabama statute burdened a fundamental right to, or liberty
interest in, sexual privacy. 4 3  The court assessed plaintiffs' undisputed
evidence describing the use of sexual devices in the nineteenth century,
which concluded that proscriptions against their use were historically rare,
as was enforcement of broader laws restricting sexual activity, even at the
height of the Victorian era.'"
The court distinguished the outcome in Glucksberg, determining that
"plaintiffs' evidence establishes that there exists a constitutionally inherent
right to sexual privacy that firmly encompasses state non-interference with
private, adult, consensual sexual relationships." 145  The district court saw
this trend continuing throughout the twentieth century as well, citing
favorably developments in the Model Penal Code' 46 and "the Griswold
Court's instruction [that] 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedom."",147  The court concluded that plaintiffs had met the
Glucksberg standard in establishing a fundamental right to sexual
privacy, la4 and that this right encompassed the use of sexual devices free
from state interference. 4 9 Since the statute burdened plaintiffs' exercise of
this right, 5° the district court applied strict scrutiny review to determine
143. See Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1274-75 (N.D. Ala.
2002) (laying out the two-part Glucksberg test and applying it to the facts at hand).
144. See id. at 1283-85, 1287-88 ("[P]laintiffs claim, without dispute, that state
regulation of consensual adult sexual activity had declined by the end of the nineteenth
century, thereby continuing to protect the marital sexual relationship, and continuing the
liberalizing trend of state non-interference with private, consensual, sexual relationships
between unmarried adults.").
145. Id. at 1296 (alteration removed).
146. See id. at 1292 ("So-called deviate sexual intercourse between spouses [like
sodomy] may contravene [a] ... notion that there is one 'right' way to achieve sexual
gratification, but there is nothing approaching societal consensus on this point.... popular
literature and available empirical data reveal that such practices are anything but
uncommon.") (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
147. Id. at 1297 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965)).
148. See id. at 1296 ("[P]laintiffs have met their burden of showing that there is a
'history, legal tradition, and practice' in this country of deliberate state non-interference with
private sexual relationships between married couples, and a contemporary practice of the
same between unmarried persons.").
149. See id. ("The fact that history and contemporary practice demonstrate a conscious
avoidance of regulation of these devices by the states, along with the fact that such devices
are used in the performance of deeply private sexual acts, supports [such] a finding .... ").
150. See id. at 1298 ("[The statute] severely limits [the user plaintiffs'] ability to access,
and thus to use, sexual devices within their sexual relationships.").
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whether the statute justified this burden by furthering a compelling state
interest with narrowly tailored means.'' In an analysis similar to that of its
prior opinion, the district court determined that the statute failed strict
scrutiny review because the statute's all-encompassing prohibition on the
distribution of sexual devices was not a narrowly tailored means of
furthering Alabama's interests, even if they were deemed "compelling." 1
52
The Supreme Court then issued its Lawrence opinion, muddying the
waters of substantive due process. 53 After Lawrence and prior to its next
decision in the Williams case, the Eleventh Circuit decided Lofion v.
Secretary of the Dept. of Children and Family Services.154  Plaintiffs in
Lofton challenged a Florida statute that prohibited adoption by
homosexuals, alleging that it burdened their fundamental substantive due
process rights to sexual intimacy. 155  Disposing of this claim and
foreshadowing its next decision in Williams, the Eleventh Circuit read
Lawrence to mean that while "substantive due process does not permit a
state to impose a criminal prohibition on private consensual homosexual
conduct.., it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to
interpret it to announce a new fundamental right."'
156
Williams made another trip to the Eleventh Circuit shortly after Lofton
was decided. 157 The court reiterated its view from Lofton that it would not
infer from Lawrence the recognition of a substantive due process right to
sexual privacy since Lawrence did not apply the Glucksberg analysis.
158
151. See id. at 1300 ("If a statute is found to infringe a fundamental constitutional right,
it will be subject to strict scrutiny .... ).
152. See id. at 1304-1307 (scrutinizing the state interests of protecting children and
unwilling adults from exposure to obscenity, banning commerce in stimulation and auto-
eroticism for its own sake unrelated to certain relationships, and banning commerce in
obscenity). Given that the district court found the statute was not rationally related to
furthering these interests in Williams I, it should not be surprising that the statute was found
not narrowly tailored in Williams III. Id.
153. SeesupraPartI.
154. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804
(1 th Cir. 2004) (deciding that after Lawrence states could not prohibit private, consensual
homosexual practices).
155. See id. at 815 ("[Plaintiffs] contend that the Florida statute, by disallowing
adoption to any individual who chooses to engage in homosexual conduct, impermissibly
burdens the exercise of this right [to private sexual intimacy].").
156. Id. at 805.
157. See Williams v. Att'y General of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir.
2004) (noting that Williams was decided six months after Lofton).
158. See id. at 1238 ("[W]e decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to
sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny. To do so would be to impose a fundamental-rights
interpretation on a decision that rested on rational-basis grounds, that never engaged in
16 WASH. & LEE JC.R. & SOC. JUST. 257 (2009)
The Eleventh Circuit thus proceeded to analyze the district court's
application of Glucksberg to plaintiffs' challenge to the Alabama obscene
devices statute. 59 Regarding Glucksberg's requirement of a careful
description of the right asserted, the appellate court noted that it had earlier
agreed with the district court's "narrowly framed" analysis of the right
asserted in Williams I as to "whether the concept of a constitutionally
protected right to privacy protects an individual's liberty to use sexual
devices when engaging in lawful, private, sexual activity."' 60 The appellate
court then criticized the district court's most recent analysis in the case,
which it viewed as re-framing asserted right "as a generalized right of
sexual privacy.' 6'' As to the second prong of the Glucksberg analysis,
requiring an evaluation of the carefully described right at issue in our
nation's history and traditions, the Eleventh Circuit found the district court
erred on four levels.162 The court thus concluded that the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause does not "encompass[] a right to use sexual
devices like... vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas," and
reversed the district court. 163 The Eleventh Circuit judges hearing the case
composed an entirely different panel from the panel that heard the first
appeal in the Williams case.164
With the fundamental rights issue removed from consideration, the
district court on remand focused on whether public morality could still
Glucksberg analysis, and that never invoked strict scrutiny.").
159. See id. at 1239 ("[Wle must turn to the two-step [Glucksberg] analytical
framework that the Court has established for evaluating new fundamental-rights claims.").
160. Id. at 1239.
161. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. See id. at 1242 (noting what the court saw as the four district court errors). Those
errors were:
The first error relates back to the district court's over-broad framing of the
asserted right in question. Having framed the relevant right as a generalized
"right to sexual privacy," the district court's history and tradition analysis
consisted largely of an irrelevant exploration of the history of sex in America.
Second, we find that this analysis placed too much weight on contemporary
practice and attitudes with respect to sexual conduct and sexual devices. Third,
rather than look for a history and tradition of protection of the asserted right, the
district court asked whether there was a history and tradition of state non-
interference with the right. Finally, we find that the district court's uncritical
reliance on certain expert declarations in interpreting the historical record was
flawed and that its reliance on certain putative "concessions" was unfounded.
Id. (alterations in original).
163. Id. at 1250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Williams HI was heard by circuit judges Anderson, Black, and Hall, while Williams
IVwas heard by circuit judges Birch, Barkett, and Hill.
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provide a rational basis for upholding the Alabama statute in the aftermath
of Lawrence's reversal of Bowers.165  The court distinguished Lawrence,
noting that the obscene devices statute did not implicate the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence, nor did it target entirely private,
non-commercial behavior like the Texas statute invalidated in Lawrence.
166
The district court thus concluded that public morality provided a rational
basis for the Alabama statute's prohibition on the distribution of obscene
sexual devices. 67  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment without
dissent.
68
The divergence between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits on sex toys
bans demonstrates just how far Lawrence has taken substantive due process
from its moorings. It is at once a substantive due process case mindful of
equal protection, a rational basis case that balanced the interests of state and
individual, and a fundamental rights case that apparently found a
fundamental right without ever declaring the presence of a fundamental
right. Lawrence provides only as much protection for private sexual
liberties as the next court interpreting it is willing to allow.
PART II: An Originalist Case for Sexual Privacy
[N]othing in the Constitution's text remotely forecloses the argument that
there is a fundamental right to control one's intimate associations, a right
which encompasses unconventional sexual behavior.69
While Part I addressed the flaws of the Court's scattershot approach
under the Fourteenth Amendment to individual liberties in general and
sexual privacy in particular, this Note proceeds to a discussion of first
165. See Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1246 (N.D. Ala. 2006)
("[F]ollowing remand, this court may examine whether our holding in Williams II that
Alabama's law has a rational basis (e.g., public morality) remains good law now that Bowers
has been overruled.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. See id. at 1250-54 ("[Tlhe Alabama statute does not offend the human dignity of a
stigmatized class of individuals, nor implicate equal protection concerns about targeting a
'discrete and insular minority' for discrimination or harm out of simple hostility, in a way
that requires the court to find the law unconstitutional under Lawrence.").
167. See id. at 1254 ("[P]ublic morality still may constitutionally serve as a rational
basis for the law in question here.").
168. See Williams v. Morgan (Williams Vi), 478 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007)
(noting a unanimous affirmation of the district court's previous decision).
169. Tribe& Dorf, supra note 52, at 1100.
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principles regarding unenumerated rights. While judicial conservatives
may decry the discovery of unenumerated rights via the Due Process
Clause, 70 there is a more "conservative," originalist case to be made as well
for limiting the power of government to reach the conduct at issue in
Lawrence, Williams, and Reliable Consultants. This Note proceeds to
sketch that argument.
A. The Ninth Amendment and Tiered Scrutiny
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
171
"[T]he body of scholarship concerning the ninth amendment does not
reach a consensus; arguably all it suggests is that lawyers do not make good
historians."'' 72  While constitutional scholars might disagree over the
meaning of Ninth Amendment's words, there is little dispute as to how they
came to be in the Bill of Rights.173 During the debate on ratification of the
Constitution, Antifederalists in several state legislatures demanded, as a
condition for ratification, that a bill of rights be appended to the
Constitution. 74  The Federalists responded that a bill of rights was
unnecessary because the Constitution's enumerated limits on federal power
provided the same protections against expansive federal power that a bill of
rights would. 75  Additionally, they argued that a bill of rights could
endanger the rights of the people, in that the enumeration of certain rights
170. See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 18 at 1575 ("[W]e think Griswold and Roe
are such erroneous glosses on the Constitution that they should be repudiated rather than
extended.").
171. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
172. Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLuM.
L. REv. 1215, 1318 (1990).
173. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEx.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) [hereinafter "Barnett, It Means What It Says"] ("This legislative history
is entirely noncontroversial, and all five competing models [of Ninth Amendment
interpretation] rely upon it.").
174. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
163 (1988) ("The Constitution was ratified only because crucial states, where ratification had
been in doubt [like New York], were willing to accept the promise of a bill of rights in the
form of subsequent amendments to the Constitution.").
175. See Barnett, It Means What It Says, supra note 173, at 7 ("Because the
Constitution was one of limited and enumerated powers, these enumerated limits constituted
a bill of rights.").
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could imply that those not listed were left unprotected by the
Constitution." 6 The Antifederalists countered that the Constitution posed
precisely the same problem, since it contained a partial enumeration of
protected rights in Article I, Section 9.177 They argued likewise that the
existence of the Necessary and Proper Clause178 diminished whatever
limiting force the enumeration of powers would have on the power of the
federal government under the proposed Constitution.
179
James Madison led the House in the first Congress in its consideration
of proposed amendments.180 He considered the Federalist objection that an
enumeration of rights would leave unenumerated rights unprotected to be
"one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights."181  To address these concerns, Madison
drafted language that would prove a precursor to the Ninth Amendment:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
82
Madison's proposals then went to a Select Committee of the House for
deliberation. 8 3 Little is known about the Select Committee's deliberations
176. See id. at 8 ("By attempting to enumerate any rights to be protected, it would
imply that all that were not listed were surrendered. And it would be impossible to
enumerate all the rights of the people.").
177. See CALvIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE
CoNsTrrToN's UNENuMERATED RIGHTS 65 (1995) [hereinafter "MAssEY, SILENT RGHTS"]
("[T]he Federalist-dominated Convention ... had already enumerated in the Constitution
such rights as the right to jury trial in criminal cases, the right to habeas corpus, and the
prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.").
178. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the United States ....").
179. See MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS, supra note 177, at 64-65 ("To Antifederalists [the
"general welfare" and "necessary and proper" clauses] seemed to convey to the central
government great expanses of power .... ).
180. See Barnett, It Means What It Says, supra note 173, at 9 (noting that Madison
introduced the "proposed precursor of the Ninth Amendment").
181. Id. (quoting James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional
Amendments (June 8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 437, 448-49 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999)).
182. Id. (internal citations omitted).
183. See id. (noting that the proposal which became the Ninth Amendment was one of
several proposals sent for consideration).
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on what eventually became the Ninth Amendment.' 4 A House Committee
on the whole added a comma, the Senate added another comma, and the
Ninth Amendment in its present textual form emerged from a joint
resolution of Congress as the eleventh proposed amendment.'85
While fleshing out the details of each school of Ninth Amendment
interpretation is beyond the scope of this Note, two schools in particular
have emerged recently as the primary models of the Ninth Amendment: the
federalist'86 and individual natural rights models.87 These models are in
accord that the Ninth provides a rule of construction by which to preserve
rights.'88 The distinction between the two is that Randy Barnett, of the
individualist school, views the Ninth Amendment as protecting
unenumerated rights from disparagement at any level of government, while
Kurt Lash, the primary exponent of the federalist model, views it as a
limitation leaving unenumerated rights to state and local majoritarian
control.'89 It is inconsistent with the anti-majoritarianism of James Madison
and the Federalists, whose concerns animated the Ninth Amendment, to
hold that the retained rights of the people are subject to majoritarian
184. See, e.g., Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69
VA. L. REV. 223, 258-59 (describing the only briefly recorded debate in the House regarding
the Ninth Amendment's language).
185. See id. (noting that the "eleventh article" became the Ninth Amendment when two
other proposed amendments failed to be ratified by the States).
186. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60
STAN. L. REv. 895, 914 (2008) ("[A]I1 retained rights are federalist in their operative effect in
that they are retained to the majoritarian control of the people in the several states.").
187. See, e.g., Barnett, It Means What It Says, supra note 173, at 13-16 (discussing the
contribution of the individual natural rights model versus the collective rights model to the
Ninth Amendment).
188. Compare id. at 14 (interpreting the Ninth as "requir[ing] that all natural rights be
protected equally-not be 'disparaged'-whether or not they are enumerated"), MASSEY,
SILENT RIGHTS, supra, note 177 at 13 ("[E]numerated and unenumerated rights are entitled to
some sort of parity .... "), and Tribe & Dorf, supra note 52 at 1100 ("The Ninth
Amendment counsels against the portrayal of enumerated rights as isolated islands of special
protection, elevated above the surrounding sea of possible unenumerated rights 'retained by
the people,' for to elevate the enumerated rights in this way would surely "disparage" those
that remain underwater."), with Lash, supra note 186, at 897 (viewing "the Ninth as a rule of
construction preserving the autonomy of the states").
189. Compare Barnett, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 175, at 242 (arguing that "both
the plain and original meanings of the Ninth Amendment require the strict construction of
any power that restricts the exercise of individual liberty. . . ") (emphasis added), with Kurt
Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REv. 801, 806
(2008) ("The Ninth Amendment was understood to preserve all retained rights, whether
individual, majoritarian, or collective, from undue federal interference, reserving control of
the same to state majorities.").
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control."l Using what Akhil Amar would call "intratextualism,"' 9' Barnett
demonstrates that the majoritarian view of retained rights would require that
the Framers meant "the people" of the Ninth Amendment to be
fundamentally different from "the people" referred to elsewhere in the Bill
of Rights.192  Barnett also notes that the founding era Court viewed
sovereignty as residing in the individual,' 93 as did early commentators such
as St. George Tucker, whom Lash relies upon as a founding era source for
the majoritarian view of retained rights.194 This Note takes the view that the
Ninth Amendment protects retained, individual rights by construing
unenumerated rights on equal terms as enumerated ones.
It may seem inappropriate to devote a section to a Note dealing
entirely with state law to a discussion of the Ninth Amendment, but it is
important to emphasize that that the Ninth Amendment, by its plain
language, furnished a rule of construction contrary to that of footnote four
of United States v. Carolene Products,95 which has since been extended to
190. See Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash's Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to the
Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 940-43 (2008)
[hereinafter "Barnett, Majoritarian Difficulty"] (citing Madison's concern that "[in all cases
where a majority are united... the rights of the minority are in danger" as well as Madison's
support for revision of the Articles of Confederation" to address the vice of 'the injustice of
state laws' that resulted from majoritarian rule") (quoting JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 76 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1984) (1840)
(statement of James Madison)).
191. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1998-1999)
("Intratextualists read a word or phrase in a given clause by self-consciously comparing and
contrasting it to identical or similar words or phrases elsewhere in the Constitution.").
192. See Barnett, Majoritarian Difficulty, supra note 190, at 947 ("When the Bill of
Rights uses the term 'the people,' it consistently refers to individuals, . . . and all the
enumerated rights it protects belong to individuals .... proponents of a collective
rights ... reading of 'the people' in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments must claim that its
meaning shifts in these provisions.").
193. See id. at 954-60 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) for the
initial proposition and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 139 (1810), for the
proposition that this view survived the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which
granted the states sovereign immunity thereby reversing the holding of Chisholm).
194. See id. at 963 ("[A]ccording to Tucker, and contrary to Lash, both the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments justify a narrow construction of federal powers. The former when the
personal rights of individuals are threatened; the latter when the rights and powers of states
are threatened."). Tucker further invokes the Tenth Amendment when he refers to the states'
"rights and power." Id.
195. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (declaring a general
presumption of constitutionality for statutes such as the congressional enactment at issue, but
cautioning that "there may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution").
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cases challenging the constitutionality of state statutes as well. 196 The effect
of a weaker presumption of constitutionality for statutes that burden a
"specific prohibition" within the Bill of Rights is to disparage those rights
and liberty interests that are not specifically enumerated by placing upon
litigants challenging state and federal laws the nearly impossible burden of
overcoming rational basis review. By turning the Ninth Amendment on its
head, the Court effectively put upon itself the burden of carving out specific
freedoms to protect against statutes reviewed under minimal scrutiny.
97
Thus the Court's misconstruction of the Ninth Amendment has furthered a
jurisprudence of selective liberty, which in turn produces inscrutable
outcomes like Lawrence v. Texas.198
The Ninth Amendment is additionally relevant in evaluating
constitutional claims to state laws because-as Section B will
demonstrate-the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally
reoriented the role of the Ninth Amendment in American constitutional law.
196. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)
(applying rational relationship test to an Oklahoma statute that barred those engaged in the
business of retailing merchandise from permitting any person purporting to do visual care to
occupy space in such retail store and deciding that there was a rational relationship between
the state's purported purpose and the statute). Note that while footnote four of Carolene
Products provided the rule of construction by which some rights could rebut the
presumption of constitutionality, the presumption itself dates to O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931), which declared that "the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." Id. at 257-58.
197. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTrruTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 204 (1993) ("[The Carolene Products
decision] required the Court to do something unprecedented; that is, to enumerate the
specific freedoms and privileges that should be considered virtually inviolate even in a
regime of expanded powers."). Gillman further notes that "under the contemporary model, it
has been assumed that the government's power should be left undisturbed unless an
individual can convince a court the law infringed on a discrete fundamental right," differing
from the nineteenth century understanding which "assumed that government should leave
individuals alone unless the state could convince a court that the exercise of power advanced
a valid public purpose." Id.
198. But cf. Tribe, Fundamental Right, supra note 20, at 1936 ("Lawrence's focus on
the role of self-regulating relationships in American liberty suggests that the 'Trivial pursuit'
version of the due process 'name that liberty' game... has finally given way to a focus on
the underlying pattern of self-government.. . defined by the rights enumerated or implicit in
the Constitution.... ."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) ("This [liberty guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause] is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of [the
provisions of the Bill of Rights] .... It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints... .") (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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B. The Privileges and Immunities of Article IV'99 and the Fourteenth
Amendment 00
The privileges and immunities of citizens were viewed as fundamental
substantive restrictions on the power of government from the time of the
founding.20' As constitutional historian Michael Kent Curtis points out,
"Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, published in the
colonies on the eve of the Revolution, had divided the rights and liberties of
Englishmen into those 'immunities' that were the residuum of natural
liberties and those 'privileges' that society had provided in lieu of natural
rights., 20 2  Blackstone's Commentaries reflects a contemporary view of
rights that is distinctly Lockean-a theory in which man, upon entering into
society, gives up some of his natural rights in exchange for the protection of
his retained rights, and adds to them certain government-created civil
rights.20 3 It is thus not surprising that Alexander Hamilton, writing in The
Federalist, viewed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of
the Constitution as "the basis of the union" and the "fundamental provision
against all [state] evasion and subterfuge[.] ', 204 Early courts took a similar
view. In Corfield v. Coryell,205 Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit,
interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause as protecting those rights
199. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
200. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States[.]").
201. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 63-65 (1986) (highlighting the history of how the
Privileges and Immunities Clause became part of the Constitution).
202. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
203. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385, 1455-56 (1992) ("The rhetoric of privileges and immunities of citizens in the
nineteenth century was heavily Lockean. It was based on the theory that individuals have
natural rights that they bring into society, and that the purpose of government is to secure
those rights."); MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS, supra note 157, at 118 (distinguishing natural
rights retained when power is ceded to the legislature, such as speech, from positive civil
rights, such as the right to jury trial, which "result from the nature of the compact" between
the individual and government) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 413 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., The Gidion ed. 2001).
205. See Corfield v. Coryell 6 F. Cas. 546, 553 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 3230)
(holding that "the power to regulate the fisheries belonging to the several states... was
exclusively vested in the states,... and that it was not surrendered to the United States, by
the mere grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the judicial branch of the
government").
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"which are, in their nature fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed
by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union from the
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. 2 °6 Washington
did not attempt a full enumeration of such fundamental rights, conceding
that the endeavor "would perhaps be more tedious than difficult," but
offered general categories of rights by way of illustration, including the
ability "to pursue and obtain happiness and safety".2 07 Prior to the Civil
War, these fundamental privileges and immunities operated only to restrict
the federal government. 20 ' Animated in part by a desire to secure these
rights against invasion by the states, the Reconstruction Congress drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.20 9 In his speech in favor of
the proposed amendment, Senator Jacob Howard began his substantive
argument with a discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, tying it
to Justice Washington's exposition of Article IV in Corfield and proposing
to add to it the rights protected by the Bill of Rights.2 0 As Curtis notes,
several other congressmen in the Thirty-ninth Congress emphasized their
support for a constitutional amendment that would "secure and enforce 'all
the guaranties' of the Constitution" while "[n]ot a single Republican in the
Thirty-ninth Congress said in debate that states were not and should not be
required to obey the Bill of Rights., 21 1 Shortly after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Samuel Miller's infamous opinion in the
Slaughter-House Cases21 2 gutted the clause of this substantive protection by
206. Id. at 551.
207. Id. at 551-52.
208. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) ("[Al1 these immunities,
privileges, rights... are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the United States and as
a party in their courts. They do not operate in the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition
upon State legislation. States are not affected by them ... ").
209. See id. at 2766 ("The great object of the first section of this amendment is,
therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees."); id. at 2542 ("There was a want hitherto, and there remains
a want now... to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of
the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction . ").
210. See id. at 2765 (quoting the opinion in Corfield and noting that "[t]o these
privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot be fully
defined in their entire extent and precise nature--to these should be added the personal
rights guaranteed ([sic]) and secured [by the Bill of Rights] ").
211. Cuitrns, supra note 201, at 130 n.293 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
566, 741, 868, 1032, 586 (1866)) (emphasis added).
212. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 63, 81 (1873) (ruling that the Due Process
Clause cannot be used to invalidate state economic laws as creating deprivations of
property).
288
LIBERTY OF INNOCENT DELIGHTS
limiting its protection to the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship. 1 3  Not surprisingly, his opinion did not rely on any direct
commentary from the Members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, nor did it
address squarely the arguments of the dissenting Justices who relied upon
such evidence, Justice Field in particular.214
Thus, there is strong evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a substantive
restriction on the states, preventing the abridgment of fundamental rights
and liberties. While these rights cannot be fully defined or enumerated,
they are illuminated by the Lockean tradition of retained, natural rights.
After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator John Sherman,
speaking on behalf of a bill to provide blacks with certain accommodations
not enumerated in the constitution, "pointed to the Ninth Amendment as
evidencing the existence of other rights beyond those recognized in the Bill
of Rights., 2 15 According to Sherman, these rights included "the ordinary
rights of citizenship, which no law has ever attempted to define exactly, the
privileges, immunities, and rights, (because I do not distinguish between
them, and cannot do it), of citizens of the United States...,,r
While Barnett notes that this was "perhaps an overly expansive"
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,217 it is entirely in keeping
with the animating spirit of Article IV, the Ninth Amendment, and the
Fourteenth Amendment to link the provisions as a bulwark against denying
and disparaging the unenumerated retained rights of the people.1 8 This
213. See id. at 78 (declaring that the privileges and immunities of state citizenship "are
those which belong to citizens of the States as such, and... they are left to the State
governments for security and protection, and not by... [the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause]"). But cf Harrison, supra note 189, at 1465-67 (arguing
that even within the limitations of Slaughter-House, the Privileges or Immunities Clause can
be construed as incorporating the Bill of Rights by defining its provisions as containing
immunities of national citizenship-such as the freedom of speech-that are thereby
protected from state interference).
214. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 98 (citing Sen. Trumbull's discussion of Corfield)
(Field, J., dissenting).
215. Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
429, 463 (2003-2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) [hereinafter "Barnett,
The Proper Scope"].
216. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., at 844 (Statement of Sen. John Sherman)
(1872).
217. Barnett, The Proper Scope, supra note 215, at 464.
218. See id. at 463 ("Just as the Fourteenth Amendment extended protection of the
enumerated rights of the first eight amendments to violations by state governments, so too
did it extend federal protection of the preexisting unenumerated rights 'retained by the
people."').
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heritage of individual sovereignty informs the following analysis of the
scope of what liberties states may abridge pursuant to the police power and
how reviewing courts are to evaluate such abridgments.
C. Limits on the Police Power of the States
The Tenth Amendment states only that "[tihe powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 2 '9 The amorphous
concept of the police power of the states began to be fleshed out in the
nineteenth century. Thomas M. Cooley, Justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court, was one of the preeminent early scholars on the police power, which
he defined as:
[Embracing a State's] whole system of internal regulation, by which the
State seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences
against the State, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with
citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are
calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent
with a like enjoyment of rights by others.220
While this commonly accepted definition of the police power is full of
loaded legal terms that can be expanded and contracted to comport with
whichever view of state power one might have, generally speaking,
Cooley's definition echoes John Stuart Mill's view of government power.
Writing contemporaneously with Cooley, Mill viewed "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others .... Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign., 221 Of
219. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
220. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 829 (7th ed.
1903) (1868).
221. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
LAW 200 (David M. Adams ed., 3d. ed. 2000). Mill elsewhere noted that the harm principle:
[R]equires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit
our own character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may
follow; without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do
does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish,
perverse, or wrong.
Id. at 201.
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course, like the terms within Cooley's definition, what constitutes third-
party harm is open to interpretation. In the context of the present
discussion, the question is whether moral vices can constitute the subject of
police power regulation. Prominent police power theorist Christopher
Tiedeman has posited that "[n]o law can make vice a crime, unless it
becomes by its consequence a trespass upon the rights of the public. 222
Additionally Tiedeman argued that "no trade can be subjected to police
regulation of any kind.., unless its prosecution involves some harm or
injury to the public or to third persons, and in any case the regulation
cannot extend beyond the evil which is to be restrained.
2 23
Both Tiedeman224 and Cooley225 nonetheless recognized some role of
the state in regulating public morality. As others have noted, even "Mill
was not opposed to legislating morality; he was opposed to legislating
morality where there is no victim. ' 226 But under any conception of the
227police power, what constitutes harm is the dispositive question. Even
conceding that states can regulate morals in some fashion or that businesses
pandering vices can be proscribed, the propriety of the state regulation still
depends on the content given to the labels of "vice" and "morals. 228 In
considering the validity of a morals-based state regulation, it is important to
222. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 291
(1971 ed.) (1886); cf (Thomas Aquinas), Summa Theologica, reprinted in 2 THE BASIC
WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS: MAN AND THE CONDUCT OF LIFE 792 (Anton C.
Pegis ed. 1997) ("[H]uman laws do not forbid all vices .... but only the more grievous
vices: ... chiefly those that are injurious to others, without the prohibition of which human
society could not be maintained. Thus human law prohibits murder, theft, and the like.").
223. TIEDMAN, supra note 222, at 301.
224. See id. at 291 (arguing that vices such as fornication, gambling, and fraud can be
indirectly regulated through state business regulations).
225. See COOLEY, supra note 220, at 830 (noting that "[flights of property, like all other
social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment
as shall prevent them from being injurious...").
226. Keith Burgess-Jackson, Our Millian Constitution: The Supreme Court's
Repudiation of Immorality as a Ground of Criminal Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 407, 410 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
227. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before
and After Lawerence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1238 (2004) ("Views about what
constitutes good and bad behavior and about the consequences of those behaviors for the
well-being of society inevitably affect opinions regarding the proper scope of government
power.").
228. See id. at 1241 ("[Clharacterizing a viewpoint as 'moral' amounts to nothing more
than a rhetorical flourish atop an ordinary normative judgment. On the other hand, a moral
judgment could be said to have special qualities distinguishing it from other normative
judgments or expressions of personal sentiment.").
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emphasize that courts reviewing state statutes must be able to divine some
manner of reviewing state statutes. As Randy Barnett has argued, were a
statue allowed to regulate private behavior "on the sole ground that a
majority of the legislature deems it to be immoral, there would be no limit
on state power since no court could review the rationality of such a
judgment. ' 229 Even the scholar most cited for his broad exposition of the
police power,230 Ernst Freund,23' voiced a concern similar to Barnett's:
"Effective judicial limitations on the police power would be impossible, if
the legislature were the sole judge of the necessity of the measures it
enacted .... Liberty and property yield to the police power, but not to the
point of destruction.,
232
D. Whither Obscene Devices?
It follows that, in attempting to give content to the role of a right to a
liberty interest in sexual privacy vis-A-vis the police power's vague
subjective labels of "morals" and "harm," we should focus on the extent to
which our ideas lend themselves to clear and consistent application by the
courts. The point of this note is, after all, to ensure greater sexual privacy
rights via the more consistent, clear jurisprudential doctrine of originalism.
Constitutional commentators Glenn Reynolds and David Kopel point
out that state courts in traditionally conservative jurisdictions have reached
seemingly liberal outcomes via police power analysis. For example in
Commonwealth v. Wasson,233 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
Kentucky's criminal prohibition on consensual homosexual sodomy
violated the right to privacy under the Kentucky Constitution. In so
holding, the Kentucky court relied heavily on an earlier decision that, in
229. Barnett, The Proper Scope, supra note 217, at 487 (emphasis omitted).
230. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 6 (1904) ("The state... exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention and
anticipation of wrong by narrowing common law rights through conventional restraints and
positive regulations which are not confined to the prohibition of wrongful acts.") (emphasis
in original).
231. See Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some
Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 511, 517 (2000) (noting that
Ernst Freund was "the expositor of the broad police power theory that dominated legal
thought in the twentieth century").
232. FREUND, supra note 230, at 60.
233. See Com. v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993) (holding that a statute
prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy violated privacy and equal protection guarantees
of Kentucky's Constitution).
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very Millian terms, declared "let a man be ever so abandoned in his
principles, or vicious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to
himself. . . he is out of the reach of human laws., 234 State bans on sodomy
were also struck down on police power grounds in the courts of
Pennsylvania,235 Tennessee,236 and Georgia.237 There is thus a tradition, at
least at the state level, of recognizing that some activities are beyond the
reach of state regulation, not because the conduct is itself protected under
some majoritarian conception of "fundamental rights," but because the state
simply lacks the power to reach the activity.
Obscenity is a different matter, however. Justice Potter Stewart's
famous maxim on obscenity-that "I know it when I see it"238-- hardly
lends itself to consistent application. The Court's bedrock rules on
obscenity attempt to clarify the concept. Obscenity is entitled to no
constitutional protection whatsoever. 39  Obscene materials are those
"works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as
whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
24
The trier of fact must resolve this question with reference to local
community standards.24' While states are free to regulate obscenity, they
may not criminalize mere private possession of obscene material.242 The
paradox of the Court's obscenity jurisprudence is that it allows
234. Id. at 495 (quoting Com. v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 386 (Ky. 1909)) (emphasis
added).
235. See Com. v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980) ("With respect to regulation of
morals, the police power should properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be
free from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a
majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others.").
236. See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 265 (Tenn. App. 1996) (finding the
court's holding in Bonadio persuasive), abrogated on other grounds by Colonial Pipeline
Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008).
237. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 25 (Ga. 1998) ("Since, as determined earlier,
the only possible purpose for the statue is to regulate the private conduct of consenting
adults ... the individual is unduly oppressed by the invasion of the right to privacy.
Consequently, we must conclude that the legislation exceeds the permissible bound of the
police power.").
238. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
239. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.").
240. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
241. See id. at 30-32 (emphasizing that it is local community standards that govern the
definition of obscenity, not a national standard).
242. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) ("[T]he mere private possession
of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.").
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constitutional protection of potentially offensive speech content to turn on
the values of local majorities. As reproductive rights scholar Kim Shayo
Buchanan points out, the Court's rules as applied tend to favor traditionalist
notions of sexual behavior.243  In Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,24
Justice White favorably cited the appellate court's reversal of an obscenity
ordinance on the grounds that the material proscribed "does no more than
arouse, 'good, old fashioned, healthy' interest in sex. 245 Based on this and
similar precedents, Buchanan concludes that "[s]exual materials and
educational resources for lesbian, gay, and other queer audiences are much
more likely to be deemed obscene for offending heterosexist community
standards. ,246
In some ways, Lawrence represents an improvement in protecting
access to sexual resources for marginalized groups against community
standards. Professor James Allon Garland, for example, argues that
24Lawrence recognizes sex is a valid form of expression.  Buchanan agrees,
and extends the argument, stating that "[t]he use of sex toys, like other
sexual activities, may be argued to convey messages of love, eroticism, or
sexual transgression. ',24' Additionally, to the extent Lawrence rejected a
morality-alone basis under rational basis review, it called into question
much of the Court's obscenity jurisprudence. As Harvard Law School
fellow Elizabeth Harmer Dionne points out, in a companion case to Miller,
243. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women s Sexuality,
56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1246 (2007) (citing cases concerning books, magazines, moving
images, nude dancing, and phone sex in support of the proposition that "[s]ince the mid-
twentieth century, the Supreme Court has afforded robust constitutional protection to the
practices and materials ... that are normally associated with straight men's sexual
pleasure").
244. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985) (holding that
Washington's moral nuisance statute should not have been invalidated in its entirety on the
ground that it reached material that incited normal, as well as unhealthy, interests in sex
where the statute contained a severability clause).
245. Id. at 499 (quoting J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 492 (9th Cir.
1984)).
246. Buchanan, supra note 243, at 1249 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
247. See Garland, supra note 79, at 304 ("Lawrence's inclusion of sex among
constitutionally protected liberties is anchored on the notion that sex involves 'intimate and
personal choices' that 'define one's own concept of existence'-the virtues of intimate and
expressive associations protected by the First Amendment."). But see Franke, supra note 19,
at 1409 (arguing that Lawrence "leaves little or no justification for protecting less-than-
transcendental sex that is not part of an ongoing relationship.") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
248. Buchanan supra note 243, at 1253.
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Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,49 the Supreme Court indicated that "states
do not need to demonstrate harm in order to restrict obscenity. 2 50 If read as
eliminating a morals-only justification for obscenity laws, then Lawrence
may require a showing of third-party harm for such laws. 25' Dionne makes
a convincing argument as to why Miller still allows courts to grant
legislatures deference in finding harm-based justifications for restrictions
on pornography.252  These justifications do not apply, however, to
restrictions on the sale of "obscene devices," which by their artificial nature
do not exploit live human subjects in the production or distribution of the
product.
Absent a third-party harm justification, the obscene devices statutes at
issue in Reliable Consultants and Williams are constitutionally dubious
under both the Supreme Court's current obscenity jurisprudence and a
hypothetical jurisprudence rooted in an originalist understanding of the
police power.253 A proper conception of the police power provides an
answer to Justice Scalia's parade of horribles in his Lawrence dissent,
activities that entail some measure of objective, third party harm, such that
the police power can still regulate them. Laws against bestiality could still
be upheld on public health grounds. So, too, could laws against prostitution
and adult incest, both of which trigger the legitimate state authority to deter
fraud and coercion that inflict third-party harm.
249. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (holding that nothing in
the Constitution precluded the State of Georgia from regulating allegedly obscene materials
exhibited at an adult theater, provided that the applicable Georgia law, as written or
interpreted by the Georgia courts, met First Amendment standards).
250. See Dionne, supra note 23, at 628 (citing Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 60-61)
("Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and
obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could reasonably determine that such connection
does or might exist.").
251. Suzanne Goldberg also demonstrates that third-party harm emerged as the
dominant justification for obscenity restrictions in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560
(1991), in which Justice Souter concurred in upholding an Indiana ban on nude dancing
while rejecting "the sufficiency of society's moral views." Id. at 582. This, Goldberg notes,
was the first time that a morals-based justification did not command a majority of the court
in upholding an obscenity law. Goldberg, supra note 227, at 1270.
252. See Dionne, supra note 23, at 628 ("Rather than eviscerating the states' already
limited ability to regulate obscenity, the [Miller] Court chose to avoid any requirement that
the states provide compelling evidence of pornography's third-party harms.").
253. The enforcement of these statutes as described in the INTRODUCTION, supra, would
likewise fall beyond the manner of enforcement endorsed by Cooley. See COOLEY, supra
note 220 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
The Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments provide vehicles by which the
Constitution circumscribes the police power of the states. A proper
adjudication of individual liberties cases should be premised on these
principles, and not on the disjointed doctrine of substantive due process,
which, in its most recent iteration, combines the majoritarian bias feared by
civil libertarians 254 with the susceptibility toward judicial activism feared by
conservatives.
255
By shifting away from the Ninth Amendment's rule of construction
and the Fourteenth Amendment's explicit substantive protection of
unenumerated rights, the Supreme Court began the era of fundamental
rights litigation, which has yielded the occasional victory for minority
rights. But as the divergence on the constitutionality of sex toy bans
between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits demonstrates, Lawrence's
purported extension of substantive due process jurisprudence has unmoored
the doctrine from any clear standard of adjudication. Charles Lund Black,
Jr., wrote that "a corpus juris of human rights... will never be built; it will
always be building, like the common law." 256 To the extent he is referring
to defining the contour of unenumerated rights generally, he is correct. The
inherent flaw in the majority opinion in Lawrence-and substantive due
process adjudication in general-is that it requires building this corpus juris
of individual rights via some form of majoritarian consensus.
Implicit in the Lawrence opinion's focus on recent history in
evaluating a fundamental rights claim, and in Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman257 that "tradition is a living thing[J,] 258 is the idea that courts
can view upon the jurisprudential horizon some idealized set of individual
rights that, once glimpsed, can no more be turned back upon than the rising
sun.259 There is no guarantee, however, that these rights will be protected
254. See, e.g., Barnett, Majoritarian Difficulty, supra note 192 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 18, at 1585 (arguing that in Lawrence the
reasoning used indicates that "due process jurisprudence has transcended the bounds of
rational discourse").
256. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 194 (1986).
257. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961) (dismissing the case for a lack of
a justifiable constitutional question because the plaintiffs had not shown that the statutes
would be enforced against them).
258. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
259. Cf Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (explaining that those who drew and ratified the
Due Process Clauses "knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress ... . As the
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long by courts rooted more in a subjective understanding of majoritarian
preferences than in the proper scope of government power.
In urging the dispersion of power in the American republic, the anti-
majoritarian James Madison warned that "[e]nlightened statesmen will not
always be at the helm . .. 260 This Note was written upon the premise that
enlightened judges will not always be at the helm, either. A greater
emphasis on first principles and the limits of state power would help to
diminish the relevance of this warning.
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles .... ).
260. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., The Gidion ed. 2001).

